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Rule 81. Applicability in General (a) To What Proceedings Applicable. (1) These rules do not apply to prize proceedings in admiralty governed by Title 10, U.S.C., § 7651-7681. They do not apply to proceedings in bankruptcy or proceedings in copyright under Title 17, U.S.C., except in so far as they may be made applicable thereto by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States. They do not apply to mental health proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (2) These rules are applicable to proceedings for admission to citizenship, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions. The writ of habeas corpus, or order to show cause, shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within 3 days unless for good cause shown additional time is allowed which in cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 shall not exceed 40 days, and in all other cases shall not exceed 20 days. (3) In proceedings under Title 9, U.S.C., relating to arbitration, or under the Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, § 9 (44 Stat. 585), U.S.C., Title 45, § 159, relating to boards of arbitration of railway labor disputes, these rules apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are not provided for in those statutes. These rules apply to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States under any statute of the United States except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the court in the proceedings. (4) These rules do not alter the method prescribed by the Act of February 18, 1922, ch. 57, § 2 (42 Stat. 388), U.S.C., Title 7, § 292; or by the Act of June 10, 1930, ch. 436, § 7 (46 Stat. 534), as amended, U.S.C., Title 7, § 499g(c), for instituting proceedings in the United States district courts to review orders of the Secretary of Agriculture; or prescribed by the Act of June 25, 1934, ch. 742, § 2 (48 Stat. 1214), U.S.C., Title 15, § 522, for instituting proceedings to review orders of the Secretary of the Interior; or prescribed by the Act of February 22, 1935, ch. 18, § 5 (49 Stat. 31), U.S.C., Title 15, § 715d(c), as extended, for instituting proceedings to review orders of petroleum control boards; but the conduct of such proceedings in the district courts shall be made to conform to these rules so far as applicable. (5) These rules do not alter the practice in the United States district courts prescribed in the Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 9 and 10 (49 Stat. 453), as amended, U.S.C., Title 29, § 159 and 160, for beginning and conducting proceedings to enforce orders of the National Labor Relations Board; and in respects not covered by those statutes, the practice in the district courts shall conform to these rules so far as applicable. (6) These rules apply to proceedings for enforcement or review of compensation orders under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, § 18, 21 (44 Stat. 1434, 1436), as amended, U.S.C., Title 33, § 918, 921, except to the extent that matters of procedure are provided for in that Act. The provisions for service by publication and for answer in proceedings to cancel certificates of citizenship under the Act of June 27, 1952, c. 477, Title III, c. 2, § 340 (66 Stat. 260), U.S.C., Title 8, § 1451, remain in effect. [(7)] (Abrogated Apr. 30, 1951, eff. Aug. 1, 1951) (b) Scire Facias and Mandamus. The writs of scire facias and mandamus are abolished. Relief heretofore available by mandamus or scire facias may be obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules. (c) Removed Actions. These rules apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the state courts and govern procedure after removal. Repleading is not necessary unless the court so orders. In a removed action in which the defendant has not answered, the defendant shall answer or present the other defenses or objections available under these rules within 20 days after the receipt through service or otherwise of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which the action or proceeding is based, or within 20 days after the service of summons upon such initial pleading, then filed, or within 5 days after the filing of the petition for removal, whichever period is longest. If at the time of removal all necessary pleadings have been served, a party entitled to trial by jury under Rule 38 shall be accorded it, if the party's demand therefor is served within 10 days after the petition for removal is filed if the party is the petitioner, or if not the petitioner within 10 days after service on the party of the notice of filing the petition. A party who, prior to removal, has made an express demand for trial by jury in accordance with state law, need not make a demand after removal. If state law applicable in the court from which the case is removed does not require the parties to make express demands in order to claim trial by jury, they need not make demands after removal unless the court directs that they do so within a specified time if they desire to claim trial by jury. The court may make this direction on its own motion and shall do so as a matter of course at the request of any party. The failure of a party to make demand as directed constitutes a waiver by that party of trial by jury. [(d) District of Columbia; Courts and Judges.] (Abrogated Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949) (e) Law Applicable. Whenever in these rules the law of the state in which the district court is held is made applicable, the law applied in the District of Columbia governs proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. When the word "state" is used, it includes, if appropriate, the District of Columbia. When the term "statute of the United States" is used, it includes, so far as concerns proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, any Act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia. When the law of a state is referred to, the word "law" includes the statutes of that state and the state judicial decisions construing them. (f) References to Officer of the United States. Under any rule in which reference is made to an officer or agency of the United States, the term "officer" includes a district director of internal revenue, a former district director or collector of internal revenue, or the personal representative of a deceased district director or collector of internal revenue. (As amended Dec. 28, 1939, eff. Apr. 3, 1941; Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Apr. 30, 1951, eff. Aug. 1, 1951; Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Dec. 4, 1967, eff. July 1, 1968; Mar. 1, 1971, eff. July 1, 1971; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1937 Note to Subdivision (a). Paragraph (1): Compare the enabling act, act of June 19, 1934, U.S.C., Title 28, § 723b [see 2072] (Rules in actions at law; Supreme Court authorized to make) and 723c [see 2072] (Union of equity and action at law rules; power of Supreme Court). For the application of these rules in bankruptcy and copyright proceedings, see Orders xxxvi and xxxvii in Bankruptcy and Rule 1 of Rules of Practice and Procedure under § 25 of the copyright act, act of March 4, 1909, U.S.C., Title 17, § 25 [see 412, 501 to 504] (Infringement and rules of procedure). For examples of statutes which are preserved by paragraph (2) see: U.S.C., Title 8, ch. 9 [former] (Naturalization); Title 28, ch. 14 [now 153] (Habeas corpus); Title 28, § 377a-377c (Quo warranto); and such forfeiture statutes as U.S.C., Title 7, § 116 (Misbranded seeds, confiscation), and Title 21, § 14 [see 334(b)] (Pure Food and Drug Act--condemnation of adulterated or misbranded food; procedure). See also 443 Cans of Frozen Eggs Product v. U.S., 226 U.S. 172, 33 S.Ct. 50 (1912). For examples of statutes which under paragraph (7) will continue to govern procedure in condemnation cases, see U.S.C., Title 40, § 258 (Condemnation of realty for sites for public building, etc., procedure); U.S.C., Title 16, § 831x (Condemnation by Tennessee Valley Authority); U.S.C., Title 40, § 120 (Acquisition of lands for public use in District of Columbia); Title 40, ch. 7 (Acquisition of lands in District of Columbia for use of United States; condemnation). Note to Subdivision (b). Some statutes which will be affected by this subdivision are:
§ 222 (Federal Trade Commission powers adopted for enforcement of Stockyards Act) (By reference to Title 15, § 49)
§ 49 (Enforcement of Federal Trade Commission orders and antitrust laws) § 77t(c) (Enforcement of Securities and Exchange Commission orders and Securities Act of 1933) § 78u(f) (Same; Securities Exchange Act of 1934) § 79r(g) (Same; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)
§ 820 (Proceedings in equity for revocation or to prevent violations of license of Federal Power Commission licensee) § 825m(b) (Mandamus to compel compliance with Federal Water Power Act, etc.)
§ 1333(c) (Mandamus to compel compliance with orders of Tariff Commission, etc.)
§ 377 [now 1651] (Power to issue writs) § 572 [now 1923] (Fees, attorneys, solicitors and proctors) § 778 [former] (Death of parties; substitution of executor or administrator). Compare Rule 25(a) (Substitution of parties; death), and the note thereto.
§ 495 (Removal of bridges over navigable waters)
§ 88 (Mandamus against Union Pacific Railroad Company) § 153(p) (Mandamus to enforce orders of Adjustment Board under Railway Labor Act) § 185 (Same; National Air Transport Adjustment Board) (By reference to § 153)
§ 11 (Powers of Federal Communications Commission) § 401(a) (Enforcement of Federal Communications Act and orders of Commission) § 406 (Same; compelling furnishing of facilities; mandamus)
§ 19a(l) [see 11703(a), 14703, 15903(a)] (Mandamus to compel compliance with Interstate Commerce Act) § 20(9) [see 11703(a), 14703, 15903(a)] (Jurisdiction to compel compliance with interstate commerce laws by mandamus) For comparable provisions in state practice see Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), ch. 110, § 179; Calif. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937) § 802. Note to Subdivision (c). Such statutes as the following dealing with the removal of actions are substantially continued and made subject to these rules:
§ 71 [now 1441, 1445, 1447] (Removal of suits from state courts) § 72 [now 1446, 1447] (Same; procedure) § 73 [former] (Same; suits under grants of land from different states) § 74 [now 1443, 1446, 1447] (Same; causes against persons denied civil rights) § 75 [now 1446] (Same; petitioner in actual custody of state court) § 76 [now 1442, 1446, 1447] (Same; suits and prosecutions against revenue officers) § 77 [now 1442] (Same; suits by aliens) § 78 [now 1449] (Same; copies of records refused by clerk of state court) § 79 [now 1450] (Same; previous attachment bonds or orders) § 80 [now 1359, 1447, 1919] (Same; dismissal or remand) § 81 [now 1447] (Same; proceedings in suits removed) § 82 [former] (Same; record; filing and return) § 83 [now 1447, 1448] (Service of process after removal) U.S.C., Title 28, § 72 [now 1446, 1447], supra, however, is modified by shortening the time for pleading in removed actions. Note to Subdivision (e). The last sentence of this subdivision modifies U.S.C., Title 28, § 725 [now 1652] (Laws of States as rules of decision) in so far as that statute has been construed to govern matters of procedure and to exclude state judicial decisions relative thereto. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1946 AMENDMENT Subdivision (a). Despite certain dicta to the contrary [Lynn v. United States (C.C.A.5th, 1940) 110 F.(2d) 586; Mount Tivy Winery, Inc. v. Lewis (N.D.Cal. 1942) 42 F.Supp. 636], it is manifest that the rules apply to actions against the United States under the Tucker Act [28 U.S.C., § 41(20), 250, 251, 254, 257, 258, 287, 289, 292, 761-765 [now 791, 1346, 1401, 1402, 1491, 1493, 1496, 1501, 1503, 2071, 2072, 2411, 2412, 2501, 2506, 2509, 2510]]. See United States to use of Foster Wheeler Corp. v. American Surety Co. of New York (E.D.N.Y. 1939) 25 F.Supp. 700; Boerner v. United States (E.D.N.Y. 1939) 26 F.Supp. 769; United States v. Gallagher (C.C.A.9th, 1945) 151 F.(2d) 556. Rules 1 and 81 provide that the rules shall apply to all suits of a civil nature, whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, except those specifically excepted; and the character of the various proceedings excepted by express statement in Rule 81, as well as the language of the rules generally, shows that the term "civil action" [Rule 2] includes actions against the United States. Moreover, the rules in many places expressly make provision for the situation wherein the United States is a party as either plaintiff or defendant. See Rules 4(d)(4), 12(a), 13(d), 25(d), 37(f), 39(c), 45(c), 54(d), 55(e), 62(e), and 65(c). In United States v. Sherwood (1941) 312 U.S. 584, the Solicitor General expressly conceded in his brief for the United States that the rules apply to Tucker Act cases. The Solicitor General stated: "The Government, of course, recognizes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to cases brought under the Tucker Act." (Brief for the United States, p. 31). Regarding Lynn v. United States, supra, the Solicitor General said: "In Lynn v. United States . . . the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went beyond the Government's contention there, and held that an action under the Tucker Act is neither an action at law nor a suit in equity and, seemingly, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are, therefore, inapplicable. We think the suggestion is erroneous. Rules 4(d), 12(a), 39(c), and 55(e) expressly contemplate suits against the United States, and nothing in the enabling Act (48 Stat. 1064) [see 28 U.S.C. 2072] suggests that the Rules are inapplicable to Tucker Act proceedings, which in terms are to accord with court rules and their subsequent modifications (Sec. 4, Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505) [see 28 U.S.C. 2071, 2072]." (Brief for the United States, p. 31, n. 17.) United States v. Sherwood, supra, emphasizes, however, that the application of the rules in Tucker Act cases affects only matters of procedure and does not operate to extend jurisdiction. See also Rule 82. In the Sherwood case, the New York Supreme Court, acting under § 795 of the New York Civil Practice Act, made an order authorizing Sherwood, as a judgment creditor, to maintain a suit under the Tucker Act to recover damages from the United States for breach of its contract with the judgment debtor, Kaiser, for construction of a post office building. Sherwood brought suit against the United States and Kaiser in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The question before the United States Supreme Court was whether a United States District Court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the United States wherein private parties were joined as parties defendant. It was contended that either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Tucker Act, or both, embodied the consent of the United States to be sued in litigations in which issues between the plaintiff and third persons were to be adjudicated. Regarding the effect of the Federal Rules, the Court declared that nothing in the rules, so far as they may be applicable in Tucker Act cases, authorized the maintenance of any suit against the United States to which it had not otherwise consented. The matter involved was not one of procedure but of jurisdiction, the limits of which were marked by the consent of the United States to be sued. The jurisdiction thus limited is unaffected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Subdivision (a)(2). The added sentence makes it clear that the rules have not superseded the requirements of U.S.C., Title 28, § 466 [now 2253]. Schenk v. Plummer (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) 113 F.(2d) 726. For correct application of the rules in proceedings for forfeiture of property for violation of a statute of the United States, such as under U.S.C., Title 22, § 405 (seizure of war materials intended for unlawful export) or U.S.C., Title 21, § 334(b) (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; formerly Title 21, § 14, Pure Food and Drug Act), see Reynal v. United States (C.C.A. 5th, 1945) 153 F.(2d) 929; United States v. 108 Boxes of Cheddar Cheese (S.D.Iowa 1943) 3 F.R.D. 40. Subdivision (a)(3). The added sentence makes it clear that the rules apply to appeals from proceedings to enforce administrative subpoenas. See Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp. (C.C.A. 2d 1942) 128 F.(2d) 208, aff'd on other grounds (1943) 317 U.S. 501; Walling v. News Printing, Inc. (C.C.A. 3d, 1945) 148 F.(2d) 57; McCrone v. United States (1939) 307 U.S. 61. And, although the provision allows full recognition of the fact that the rigid application of the rules in the proceedings themselves may conflict with the summary determination desired [Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 6th, 1941) 122 F.(2d) 450; Cudahy Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 10th, 1941) 117 F.(2d) 692], it is drawn so as to permit application of any of the rules in the proceedings whenever the district court deems them helpful. See, e.g., Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission (App. D.C. 1942) 127 F.(2d) 153, cert. den. (1942) 316 U.S. 700; Martin v. Chandis Securities Co. (C.C.A. 9th, 1942) 128 F.(2d) 731. Compare the application of the rules in summary proceedings in bankruptcy under General Order 37. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed. by Moore and Oglebay) 326-327; 2 Collier, op. cit. supra, 1401-1402; 3 Collier, op. cit. supra, 228-231; 4 Collier, op. cit. supra, 1199-1202. Subdivision (a)(6). Section 405 of U.S.C., Title 8 originally referred to in the last sentence of paragraph (6), has been repealed and § 738 [see 1451], U.S.C., Title 8, has been enacted in its stead. The last sentence of paragraph (6) has, therefore, been amended in accordance with this change. The sentence has also been amended so as to refer directly to the statute regarding the provision of time for answer, thus avoiding any confusion attendant upon a change in the statute. That portion of subdivision (a)(6) making the rules applicable to proceedings for enforcement or review of compensation orders under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act [33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.] was added by an amendment made pursuant to order of the Court, December 28, 1939, effective three months subsequent to the adjournment of the 76th Congress, January 3, 1941. Subdivision (c). The change in subdivision (c) effects more speedy trials in removed actions. In some states many of the courts have only two terms a year. A case, if filed 20 days before a term, is returnable to that term, but if filed less than 20 days before a term, is returnable to the following term, which convenes six months later. Hence, under the original wording of Rule 81(c), where a case is filed less than 20 days before the term and is removed within a few days but before answer, it is possible for the defendant to delay interposing his answer or presenting his defenses by motion for six months or more. The rule as amended prevents this result. Subdivision (f). The use of the phrase "the United States or an officer or agency thereof" in the rules (as e.g., in Rule 12(a) and amended Rule 73(a)) could raise the question of whether "officer" includes a collector of internal revenue, a former collector, or the personal representative of a deceased collector, against whom suits for tax refunds are frequently instituted. Difficulty might ensue for the reason that a suit against a collector or his representative has been held to be a personal action. Sage v. United States (1919) 250 U.S. 33; Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co. (1921) 257 U.S. 1; United States v. Nunnally Investment Co. (1942) 316 U.S. 258. The addition of subdivision (f) to Rule 81 dispels any doubts on the matter and avoids further litigation. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1948 AMENDMENT Subdivision (a)_Paragraph (1).--The Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, as amended, was repealed and Title 17, U.S.C., enacted into positive law by the Act of July 30, 1947, c. 391, § 1, 2, 61 Stat. 652. The first amendment, therefore, reflects this change. The second amendment involves a matter of nomenclature and reflects the official designation of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Title 28, U.S.C. § 88, 132. Paragraph (2).--The amendment substitutes the present statutory reference. Paragraph (3).--The Arbitration Act of February 12, 1925, was repealed and Title 9, U.S.C., enacted into positive law by the Act of July 30, 1947, c. 392, § 1, 2, 61 Stat. 669, and the amendment reflects this change. The Act of May 20, 1926, c. 347, § 9 (44 Stat. 585), U.S.C., Title 45, § 159, deals with the review by the district court of an award of a board of arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, and provides, inter alia, for an appeal within 10 days from a final judgment of the district court to the court of appeals. It is not clear whether Title 28, U.S.C., repealed this time period and substituted the time periods provided for in Title 28, U.S.C., § 2107, normally a minimum of 30 days. If there has been no repeal, then the 10-day time period of 45 U.S.C., § 159, applies by virtue of the "unless" clause in Rule 73(a); if there has been a repeal, then the other time periods stated in Rule 73(a), normally a minimum of 30 days, apply. For discussion, see Note to Rule 73 (§ ), supra. Paragraph (4).--The nomenclature of the district courts is changed to conform to the official designation in Title 28, U.S.C., § 132(a). Paragraph (5).--The nomenclature of the district courts is changed to conform to the official designation in Title 28, U.S.C., § 132(a). The Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 9 and 10, was amended by Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, 61 Stat. 143, 146, and will probably be amended from time to time. Insertion in Rule 81(a)(5) of the words "as amended", and deletion of the subsection reference "(e), (g), and (i)" of U.S.C., Title 29, § 160, make correcting references and are sufficiently general to include future statutory amendment. Paragraph (6).--The Chinese Exclusion Acts were repealed by the Act of December 17, 1943, c. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600, and hence the reference to the Act of September 13, 1888, as amended, is deleted. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, was amended by Act of June 25, 1936, c. 804, 49 Stat. 1921, and hence the words "as amended" have been added to reflect this change and, as they are sufficiently general, to include future statutory amendment. The Nationality Act of October 14, 1940, c. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, 1172, repealed and replaced the Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, and correcting statutory references are, therefore, made. Subdivision (c).--In the first sentence the change in nomenclature conforms to the official designation of district courts in Title 28, U.S.C., § 132(a); and the word "all" is deleted as superfluous. The need for revision of the third sentence is occasioned by the procedure for removal set forth in revised Title 28, U.S.C., § 1446. Under the prior removal procedure governing civil actions, 28 U.S.C., § 72 (1946), the petition for removal had to be first presented to and filed with the state court, except in the case of removal on the basis of prejudice or local influence, within the time allowed "to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff"; and the defendant had to file a transcript of the record in the federal court within thirty days from the date of filing his removal petition. Under § 1446(a) removal is effected by a defendant filing with the proper United States district court "a verified petition containing a short and plain statement of the facts which entitled him or them to removal together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon him or them in such action." And § 1446(b) provides: "The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding may be filed within twenty days after commencement of the action or service of process, whichever is later." This subsection (b) gives trouble in states where an action may be both commenced and service of process made without serving or otherwise giving the defendant a copy of the complaint or other initial pleading. To cure this statutory defect, the Judge's Committee appointed pursuant to action of the Judicial Conference and headed by Judge Albert B. Maris is proposing an amendment to § 1446(b) to read substantially as follows: "The petition for removal of a civil action or proceedings shall be filed within 20 days after the receipt through service or otherwise by the defendant of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which the action or proceeding is based." The revised third sentence of Rule 81(c) is geared to this proposed statutory amendment; and it gives the defendant at least 5 days after removal within which to present his defenses.*
The change in the last sentence of subdivision (c) reflects the fact that a transcript of the record is no longer required under § 1446, and safeguards the right to demand a jury trial, where the right has not already been waived and where the parties are at issue--"all necessary pleadings have been served." Only, rarely will the last sentence of Rule 81(c) have any applicability, since removal will normally occur before the pleadings are closed, and in this usual situation Rule 38(b) applies and safeguards the right to jury trial. See Moore's Federal practice (1st ed.) 3020. Subdivision (d).--This subdivision is abrogated because it is obsolete and unnecessary under Title 28, U.S.C. Sections 88, 132, and 133 provide that the District of Columbia constitutes a judicial district, the district court of that district is the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the personnel of that court are district judges. Sections 41, 43, and 44 provide that the District of Columbia is a judicial circuit, the court of appeals of that circuit is the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the personnel of that court are circuit judges. Subdivision (e).--The change in nomenclature conforms to the official designation of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Title 28, U.S.C., § 132(a), 88. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1963 AMENDMENT Subdivision (a)(4). This change reflects the transfer of functions from the Secretary of Commerce to the Secretary of the Interior made by 1939 Reorganization Plan No. II, § 4(e), 53 Stat. 1433. Subdivision (a)(6). The proper current reference is to the 1952 statute superseding the 1940 statute. Subdivision (c). Most of the cases have held that a party who has made a proper express demand for jury trial in the State court is not required to renew the demand after removal of the action. Zakoscielny v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 16 F.R.D. 314 (D.Md. 1954); Talley v. American Bakeries Co., 15 F.R.D. 391 (E.D.Tenn. 1954); Rehrer v. Service Trucking Co., 15 F.R.D. 113 (D.Del. 1953); 5 Moore's Federal Practice § 38.39[3] (2d ed. 1951); 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 132 (Wright ed. 1960). But there is some authority to the contrary. Petsel v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 101 F.Supp. 1006 (S.D.Iowa 1951) Nelson v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 9 F.R.D. 680 (E.D.Tenn. 1950). The amendment adopts the preponderant view. In order still further to avoid unintended waivers of jury trial, the amendment provides that where by State law applicable in the court from which the case is removed a party is entitled to jury trial without making an express demand, he need not make a demand after removal. However, the district court for calendar or other purposes may on its own motion direct the parties to state whether they demand a jury, and the court must make such a direction upon the request of any party. Under the amendment a district court may find it convenient to establish a routine practice of giving these directions to the parties in appropriate cases. Subdivision (f). The amendment recognizes the change of nomenclature made by Treasury Dept. Order 150-26(2), 18 Fed. Reg. 3499 (1953). As to a special problem arising under Rule 25 (Substitution of parties) in actions for refund of taxes, see the Advisory Committee's Note to the amendment of Rule 25(d), effective July 19, 1961; and 4 Moore's Federal Practice § 25.09 at 531 (2d ed. 1950). NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT See Note to Rule 1, supra. Statutory proceedings to forfeit property for violation of the laws of the United States, formerly governed by the admiralty rules, will be governed by the unified and supplemental rules. See Supplemental Rule A. Upon the recommendation of the judges of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are made applicable to probate proceedings in that court. The exception with regard to adoption proceedings is removed because the court no longer has jurisdiction of those matters; and the words "mental health" are substituted for "lunacy" to conform to the current characterization in the District. The purpose of the amendment to paragraph (3) is to permit the deletion from Rule 73(a) of the clause "unless a shorter time is provided by law." The 10 day period fixed for an appeal under 45 U.S.C. § 159 is the only instance of a shorter time provided for appeals in civil cases. Apart from the unsettling effect of the clause, it is eliminated because its retention would preserve the 15 day period heretofore allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 2107 for appeals from interlocutory decrees in admiralty, it being one of the purposes of the amendment to make the time for appeals in civil and admiralty cases uniform under the unified rules. See Advisory Committee's Note to subdivision (a) of Rule 73. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1968 AMENDMENT The amendments eliminate inappropriate references to appellate procedure. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1971 AMENDMENT Title 28, U.S.C., § 2243 now requires that the custodian of a person detained must respond to an application for a writ of habeas corpus "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." The amendment increases to forty days the additional time that the district court may allow in habeas corpus proceedings involving persons in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court. The substantial increase in the number of such proceedings in recent years has placed a considerable burden on state authorities. Twenty days has proved in practice too short a time in which to prepare and file the return in many such cases. Allowance of additional time should, of course, be granted only for good cause. While the time allowed in such a case for the return of the writ may not exceed forty days, this does not mean that the state must necessarily be limited to that period of time to provide for the federal court the transcript of the proceedings of a state trial or plenary hearing if the transcript must be prepared after the habeas corpus proceeding has begun in the federal court. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1987 AMENDMENT The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ABROGATION Abrogation of par. (7) of subdivision (a) of this rule as effective August 1, 1951, see Effective Date note under Rule 71A. Rule 82. Jurisdiction and Venue Unaffected These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein. An admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) shall not be treated as a civil action for the purposes of Title 28, U.S.C., § 1391-93. (As amended Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1937 These rules grant extensive power of joining claims and counterclaims in one action, but, as this rule states, such grant does not extend federal jurisdiction. The rule is declaratory of existing practice under the [former] Federal Equity Rules with regard to such provisions as [former] Equity Rule 26 on Joinder of Causes of Action and [former] Equity Rule 30 on Counterclaims. Compare Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 393 (1936). NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1948 AMENDMENT The change in nomenclature conforms to the official designation of district courts in Title 28, U.S.C., § 132(a). NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT Title 28, U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law." This provision cannot appropriately be applied to what were formerly suits in admiralty. The rationale of decisions holding it inapplicable rests largely on the use of the term "civil action"; i.e., a suit in admiralty is not a "civil action" within the statute. By virtue of the amendment to Rule 1, the provisions of Rule 2 convert suits in admiralty into civil actions. The added sentence is necessary to avoid an undesirable change in existing law with respect to venue. Rule 83. Rules by District Courts; Judge's Directives (a) Local Rules. (1) Each district court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment, make and amend rules governing its practice. A local rule shall be consistent with--but not duplicative of--Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and 2075, and shall conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States. A local rule takes effect on the date specified by the district court and remains in effect unless amended by the court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit. Copies of rules and amendments shall, upon their promulgation, be furnished to the judicial council and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and be made available to the public. (2) A local rule imposing a requirement of form shall not be enforced in a manner that causes a party to lose rights because of a nonwillful failure to comply with the requirement. (b) Procedures When There is No Controlling Law. A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and 2075, and local rules of the district. No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case with actual notice of the requirement. (As amended Apr. 29, 1985, eff. Aug. 1, 1985; Apr. 27, 1995, eff. Dec. 1, 1995.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1937 This rule substantially continues U.S.C., Title 28, § 731 [now 2071] (Rules of practice in district courts) with the additional requirement that copies of such rules and amendments be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. See [former] Equity Rule 79 (Additional Rules by District Court). With the last sentence compare United States Supreme Court Admiralty Rules (1920), Rule 44 (Right of Trial Courts To Make Rules of Practice) (originally promulgated in 1842). NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1985 AMENDMENT Rule 83, which has not been amended since the Federal Rules were promulgated in 1938, permits each district to adopt local rules not inconsistent with the Federal Rules by a majority of the judges. The only other requirement is that copies be furnished to the Supreme Court. The widespread adoption of local rules and the modest procedural prerequisites for their promulgation have led many commentators to question the soundness of the process as well as the validity of some rules, See 12 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 3152, at 217 (1973); Caballero, Is There an Over-Exercise of Local Rule-Making Powers by the United States District Courts?, 24 Fed. Bar News 325 (1977). Although the desirability of local rules for promoting uniform practice within a district is widely accepted, several commentators also have suggested reforms to increase the quality, simplicity, and uniformity of the local rules. See Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 1251 (1967), and Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts_A Survey, 1966 Duke L.J. 1011. The amended Rule attempts, without impairing the procedural validity of existing local rules, to enhance the local rulemaking process by requiring appropriate public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them. Although some district courts apparently consult the local bar before promulgating rules, many do not, which has led to criticism of a process that has district judges consulting only with each other. See 12 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 3152, at 217; Blair, The New Local Rules for Federal Practice In Iowa, 23 Drake L.Rev. 517 (1974). The new language subjects local rulemaking to scrutiny similar to that accompanying the Federal Rules, administrative rulemaking, and legislation. It attempts to assure that the expert advice of practitioners and scholars is made available to the district court before local rules are promulgated. See Weinstein, Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures 84-87, 127-37, 151 (1977). The amended Rule does not detail the procedure for giving notice and an opportunity to be heard since conditions vary from district to district. Thus, there is no explicit requirement for a public hearing, although a district may consider that procedure appropriate in all or some rulemaking situations. See generally, Weinstein, supra, at 117-37, 151. The new Rule does not foreclose any other form of consultation. For example, it can be accomplished through the mechanism of an "Advisory Committee" similar to that employed by the Supreme Court in connection with the Federal Rules themselves. The amended Rule provides that a local rule will take effect upon the date specified by the district court and will remain in effect unless amended by the district court or abrogated by the judicial council. The effectiveness of a local rule should not be deferred until approved by the judicial council because that might unduly delay promulgation of a local rule that should become effective immediately, especially since some councils do not meet frequently. Similarly, it was thought that to delay a local rule's effectiveness for a fixed period of time would be arbitrary and that to require the judicial council to abrogate a local rule within a specified time would be inconsistent with its power under 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1976) to nullify a local rule at any time. The expectation is that the judicial council will examine all local rules, including those currently in effect, with an eye toward determining whether they are valid and consistent with the Federal Rules, promote inter-district uniformity and efficiency, and do not undermine the basic objectives of the Federal Rules. The amended Rule requires copies of local rules to be sent upon their promulgation to the judicial council and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts rather than to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was the appropriate filing place in 1938, when Rule 83 originally was promulgated, but the establishment of the Administrative Office makes it a more logical place to develop a centralized file of local rules. This procedure is consistent with both the Criminal and the Appellate Rules. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 57(a); Fed.R.App.P. 47. The Administrative Office also will be able to provide improved utilization of the file because of its recent development of a Local Rules Index. The practice pursued by some judges of issuing standing orders has been controversial, particularly among members of the practicing bar. The last sentence in Rule 83 has been amended to make certain that standing orders are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules or any local district court rules. Beyond that, it is hoped that each district will adopt procedures, perhaps by local rule, for promulgating and reviewing single-judge standing orders. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1995 AMENDMENT Subdivison (a). This rule is amended to reflect the requirement that local rules be consistent not only with the national rules but also with Acts of Congress. The amendment also states that local rules should not repeat Acts of Congress or national rules. The amendment also requires that the numbering of local rules conform with any uniform numbering system that may be prescribed by the Judicial Conference. Lack of uniform numbering might create unnecessary traps for counsel and litigants. A uniform numbering system would make it easier for an increasingly national bar and for litigants to locate a local rule that applies to a particular procedural issue. Paragraph (2) is new. Its aim is to protect against loss of rights in the enforcement of local rules relating to matters of form. For example, a party should not be deprived of a right to a jury trial because its attorney, unaware of--or forgetting--a local rule directing that jury demands be noted in the caption of the case, includes a jury demand only in the body of the pleading. The proscription of paragraph (2) is narrowly drawn--covering only violations attributable to nonwillful failure to comply and only those involving local rules directed to matters of form. It does not limit the court's power to impose substantive penalties upon a party if it or its attorney contumaciously or willfully violates a local rule, even one involving merely a matter of form. Nor does it affect the court's power to enforce local rules that involve more than mere matters of form--for example, a local rule requiring parties to identify evidentiary matters relied upon to support or oppose motions for summary judgment. Subdivision (b). This rule provides flexibility to the court in regulating practice when there is no controlling law. Specifically, it permits the court to regulate practice in any manner consistent with Acts of Congress, with rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and 2075, and with the district local rules. This rule recognizes that courts rely on multiple directives to control practice. Some courts regulate practice through the published Federal Rules and the local rules of the court. Some courts also have used internal operating procedures, standing orders, and other internal directives. Although such directives continue to be authorized, they can lead to problems. Counsel or litigants may be unaware of various directives. In addition, the sheer volume of directives may impose an unreasonable barrier. For example, it may be difficult to obtain copies of the directives. Finally, counsel or litigants may be unfairly sanctioned for failing to comply with a directive. For these reasons, the amendment to this rule disapproves imposing any sanction or other disadvantage on a person for noncompliance with such an internal directive, unless the alleged violator has been furnished actual notice of the requirement in a particular case. There should be no adverse consequence to a party or attorney for violating special requirements relating to practice before a particular court unless the party or attorney has actual notice of those requirements. Furnishing litigants with a copy outlining the judge's practices--or attaching instructions to a notice setting a case for conference or trial--would suffice to give actual notice, as would an order in a case specifically adopting by reference a judge's standing order and indicating how copies can be obtained. Rule 84. Forms The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate. (As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1937 In accordance with the practice found useful in many codes, provision is here made for a limited number of official forms which may serve as guides in pleading. Compare 2 Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed., 1932) ch. 231, § 147, Forms 1-47; English Annual Practice (1937) Appendix A to M, inclusive; Conn. Practice Book (1934) Rules, 47-68, pp. 123-427. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1946 AMENDMENT The amendment serves to emphasize that the forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient to withstand attack under the rules under which they are drawn, and that the practitioner using them may rely on them to that extent. The circuit courts of appeals generally have upheld the use of the forms as promoting desirable simplicity and brevity of statement. Sierocinski v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. (C.C.A. 3d, 1939) 103 F.(2d) 843; Swift & Co. v. Young (C.C.A. 4th, 1939) 107 F.(2d) 170; Sparks v. England (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) 113 F.(2d) 579; Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R. Co. (C.C.A. 8th, 1943) 135 F.(2d) 101. And the forms as a whole have met with widespread approval in the courts. See cases cited in 1 Moore's Federal Practice (1938), Cum. Supplement § 8.07, under "Page 554"; see also Commentary, The Official Forms (1941) 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 954. In Cook, "Facts'' and ``Statements of Fact'' (1937) 4 U.Chi.L.Rev. 233, 245ÿ09246, it is said with reference to what is now Rule 84: ``. . . pleaders in the federal courts are not to be left to guess as to the meaning of [the] language'' in Rule 8 (a) regarding the form of the complaint. ``All of which is as it should be. In no other way can useless litigation be avoided.'' Ibid. The amended rule will operate to discourage isolated results such as those found in Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co. (S.D.Cal. 1938) 25 F.Supp. 546; Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Blue Line Transfer Co. (W.D.Mo. 1941) 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 12e.235, Case 2. Rule 85. Title These rules may be known and cited as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 86. Effective Date (a) 1 [Effective Date of Original Rules.] These rules will take effect on the day which is 3 months subsequent to the adjournment of the second regular session of the 75th Congress, but if that day is prior to September 1, 1938, then these rules will take effect on September 1, 1938. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies.
(b) Effective Date of Amendments. The amendments adopted by the Supreme Court on December 27, 1946, and transmitted to the Attorney General on January 2, 1947, shall take effect on the day which is three months subsequent to the adjournment of the first regular session of the 80th Congress, but, if that day is prior to September 1, 1947, then these amendments shall take effect on September 1, 1947. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the amendments take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies. (c) Effective Date of Amendments. The amendments adopted by the Supreme Court on December 29, 1948, and transmitted to the Attorney General on December 31, 1948, shall take effect on the day following the adjournment of the first regular session of the 81st Congress. (d) Effective Date of Amendments. The amendments adopted by the Supreme Court on April 17, 1961, and transmitted to the Congress on April 18, 1961, shall take effect on July 19, 1961. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the amendments take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies. (e) Effective Date of Amendments. The amendments adopted by the Supreme Court on January 21, 1963, and transmitted to the Congress on January 21, 1963, shall take effect on July 1, 1963. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the amendments take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies. (As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Apr. 17, 1961, eff. July 19, 1961; Jan. 21 and Mar. 18, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1937 See [former] Equity Rule 81 (These Rules Effective February 1, 1913--Old Rules Abrogated). NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1948 AMENDMENT By making the general amendments effective on the day following the adjournment of the first regular session of Congress to which they are transmitted, subdivision (c), supra, departs slightly from the prior practice of making amendments effective on the day which is three months subsequent to the adjournment of Congress or on September 1 of that year, whichever day is later. The reason for this departure is that no added period of time is needed for the Bench and Bar to acquaint themselves with the general amendments, which effect a change in nomenclature to conform to revised Title 28, substitute present statutory references to this Title and cure the omission or defect occasioned by the statutory revision in relation to the substitution of public officers, to a cost bond on appeal, and to procedure after removal (see Rules 25(d), 73(c), 81(c)). EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT; TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS; RESCISSION Sections 2-4 of the Order of the Supreme Court, dated Feb. 28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1031, provided: "2. That the foregoing amendments and additions to the Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on July 1, 1966, and shall govern all proceedings in actions brought thereafter and also in all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action then pending would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies. "3. That the Chief Justice be, and he hereby is, authorized to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments and additions to the Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with the provisions of Title 28, U.S.C., § 2072 and 2073. "4. That: (a) subdivision (c) of Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts promulgated by this court on December 20, 1937, effective September 16, 1938; (b) Rule 2 of the Rules for Practice and Procedure under section 25 of An Act To amend and consolidate the Acts respecting copyright, approved March 4, 1909, promulgated by this court on June 1, 1909, effective July 1, 1909; and (c) the Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, promulgated by this court on December 6, 1920, effective March 7, 1921, as revised, amended and supplemented be, and they hereby are, rescinded, effective July 1, 1966." |
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