
From the U.S. Code Online via GPO Access
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[Laws in effect as of January 2, 2001]
[Document not affected by Public Laws enacted between
  January 2, 2001 and January 28, 2002]
[CITE: 22USC6321]

 
               TITLE 22--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE
 
              CHAPTER 72--NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION
 
            SUBCHAPTER II--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
 
Sec. 6321. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives

    It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and 
enhance international confidence in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards 
and in other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with 
other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of 
Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to--
        (1) build international support for the principle that nuclear 
    supply relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to 
    full-scope international safeguards;
        (2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of 
    the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures 
    for declassifying information relating to the design or production 
    of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that 
    would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear 
    weapons proliferation;
        (3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weapons-grade 
    nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as 
    safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable 
    basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for 
    nuclear explosive purposes;
        (4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and 
    improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with 
    significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that 
    are currently using or planning to use weapons-grade nuclear 
    material for commercial purposes;
        (5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial 
    contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United 
    States;
        (6) pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly 
    enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging 
    multilateral cooperation to develop and to use low-enriched 
    alternative nuclear fuels;
        (7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or 
    use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;
        (8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would 
    authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would 
    facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards 
    verification purposes;
        (9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to 
    share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards 
    violations without compromising national security or intelligence 
    sources or methods;
        (10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or 
    sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify 
    the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that 
    facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and
        (11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply 
    IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the 
    right to withdraw from the Treaty.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, Sec. 841, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 522.)

                  Section Referred to in Other Sections

    This section is referred to in section 6323 of this title.
