
From the U.S. Code Online via GPO Access
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[Laws in effect as of January 2, 2001]
[Document not affected by Public Laws enacted between
  January 2, 2001 and January 28, 2002]
[CITE: 28USC2244]

 
               TITLE 28--JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
 
                     PART VI--PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
 
                       CHAPTER 153--HABEAS CORPUS
 
Sec. 2244. Finality of determination

    (a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of 
a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it 
appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a 
judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of 
habeas corpus, except as provided in section 2255.
    (b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus 
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application 
shall be dismissed.
    (2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus 
application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior 
application shall be dismissed unless--
        (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of 
    constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 
    by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
        (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 
    discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
        (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in 
    light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish 
    by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, 
    no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of 
    the underlying offense.

    (3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this 
section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the 
appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court 
to consider the application.
    (B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the 
district court to consider a second or successive application shall be 
determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.
    (C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or 
successive application only if it determines that the application makes 
a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of 
this subsection.
    (D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to 
file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the 
filing of the motion.
    (E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to 
file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and 
shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of 
certiorari.
    (4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second 
or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be 
filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the 
requirements of this section.
    (c) In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a prior judgment of 
the Supreme Court of the United States on an appeal or review by a writ 
of certiorari at the instance of the prisoner of the decision of such 
State court, shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law with 
respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right which constitutes 
ground for discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding, actually adjudicated 
by the Supreme Court therein, unless the applicant for the writ of 
habeas corpus shall plead and the court shall find the existence of a 
material and controlling fact which did not appear in the record of the 
proceeding in the Supreme Court and the court shall further find that 
the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus could not have caused such 
fact to appear in such record by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
    (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 
latest of--
        (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 
    conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
    seeking such review;
        (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 
    created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
    the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 
    filing by such State action;
        (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 
    initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 
    newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
    applicable to cases on collateral review; or
        (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 
    claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 
    due diligence.

    (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 
limitation under this subsection.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 965; Pub. L. 89-711, Sec. 1, Nov. 2, 
1966, 80 Stat. 1104; Pub. L. 104-132, title I, Secs. 101, 106, Apr. 24, 
1996, 110 Stat. 1217, 1220.)


                      Historical and Revision Notes

    This section makes no material change in existing practice. 
Notwithstanding the opportunity open to litigants to abuse the writ, the 
courts have consistently refused to entertain successive ``nuisance'' 
applications for habeas corpus. It is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced 
in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Hatton 
Sumners of the Committee on the Judiciary and referred to that 
Committee.
    The practice of suing out successive, repetitious, and unfounded 
writs of habeas corpus imposes an unnecessary burden on the courts. See 
Dorsey v. Gill, 1945, 148 F.2d 857, 862, in which Miller, J., notes that 
``petitions for the writ are used not only as they should be to protect 
unfortunate persons against miscarriages of justice, but also as a 
device for harassing court, custodial, and enforcement officers with a 
multiplicity of repetitious, meritless requests for relief. The most 
extreme example is that of a person who, between July 1, 1939, and April 
1944 presented in the District Court 50 petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus; another person has presented 27 petitions; a third, 24; a 
fourth, 22; a fifth, 20. One hundred nineteen persons have presented 597 
petitions--an average of 5.''


                       Senate Revision Amendments

    Section amended to modify original language which denied Federal 
judges power to entertain application for writ where legality of 
detention had been determined on prior application and later application 
presented no new grounds, and to omit reference to rehearing in section 
catch line and original provision authorizing hearing judge to grant 
rehearing. 80th Congress, Senate Report No. 1559, Amendment No. 45.


                               Amendments

    1996--Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104-132, Sec. 106(a), substituted ``, 
except as provided in section 2255.'' for ``and the petition presents no 
new ground not heretofore presented and determined, and the judge or 
court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such 
inquiry.''
    Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 104-132, Sec. 106(b), amended subsec. (b) 
generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (b) read as follows: ``When after 
an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or 
after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of 
the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release 
from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 
of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United States 
or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application 
alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated 
on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the 
court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the 
earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or 
otherwise abused the writ.''
    Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104-132, Sec. 101, added subsec. (d).
    1966--Pub. L. 89-711 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), 
struck out provision making the subsection's terms applicable to 
applications seeking inquiry into detention of persons detained pursuant 
to judgments of State courts, and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

                  Section Referred to in Other Sections

    This section is referred to in sections 2255, 2262, 2266 of this 
title.
