
From the U.S. Code Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov]
[Laws in effect as of January 23, 2000]
[Document not affected by Public Laws enacted between
  January 23, 2000 and December 4, 2001]
[CITE: 42USC7274p]

 
                 TITLE 42--THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
 
                    CHAPTER 84--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
 
                SUBCHAPTER VI--ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
 
                Part C--General Administrative Provisions
 
Sec. 7274p. Advice to President and Congress regarding safety, 
        security, and reliability of United States nuclear weapons 
        stockpile
        

(a) Findings

    Congress makes the following findings:
        (1) Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons on earth. 
    The United States and its allies continue to rely on nuclear weapons 
    to deter potential adversaries from using weapons of mass 
    destruction. The safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons 
    stockpile are essential to ensure its credibility as a deterrent.
        (2) On September 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the 
    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
        (3) Effective as of September 30, 1996, the United States is 
    prohibited by section 507 of the Energy and Water Development 
    Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-377; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) 
    from conducting underground nuclear tests ``unless a foreign state 
    conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the 
    prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted''.
        (4) Section 1436(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, 
    Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) requires 
    the Secretary of Energy to ``establish and support a program to 
    assure that the United States is in a position to maintain the 
    reliability, safety, and continued deterrent effect of its stockpile 
    of existing nuclear weapons designs in the event that a low-
    threshold or comprehensive test ban on nuclear explosive testing is 
    negotiated and ratified.''.
        (5) Section 3138(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
    for Fiscal Year 1994 \1\ (Public Law 103-160; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) 
    required the President to submit an annual report to Congress which 
    sets forth ``any concerns with respect to the safety, security, 
    effectiveness, or reliability of existing United States nuclear 
    weapons raised by the Stockpile Stewardship Program of the 
    Department of Energy''.
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    \1\ See References in Text note below.
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        (6) President Clinton declared in July 1993 that ``to assure 
    that our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test ban, we 
    will explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the 
    safety, reliability, and the performance of our weapons''. This 
    decision was incorporated in a Presidential Directive.
        (7) Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
    Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) also 
    requires that the Secretary of Energy establish a ``stewardship 
    program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and 
    technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons''.
        (8) The plan of the Department of Energy to maintain the safety 
    and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile is 
    known as the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The 
    ability of the United States to maintain and certify the safety, 
    security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons 
    stockpile without testing will require utilization of new and 
    sophisticated computational capabilities and diagnostic 
    technologies, methods, and procedures. Current diagnostic 
    technologies and laboratory testing techniques are insufficient to 
    certify the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear 
    weapons stockpile into the future. Whereas in the past laboratory 
    and diagnostic tools were used in conjunction with nuclear testing, 
    in the future they will provide, under the Department of Energy's 
    stockpile stewardship plan, the sole basis for assessing past test 
    data and for making judgments on phenomena observed in connection 
    with the aging of the stockpile.
        (9) Section 7274o of this title requires that the directors of 
    the nuclear weapons laboratories and the nuclear weapons production 
    plants submit a report to the Assistant Secretary of Energy for 
    Defense Programs if they identify a problem that has significant 
    bearing on confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear 
    weapon or nuclear weapon type, that the Assistant Secretary must 
    transmit that report, along with any comments, to the congressional 
    defense committees and to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary 
    of Defense, and that the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council advise 
    Congress regarding its analysis of any such problems.
        (10) On August 11, 1995, President Clinton directed ``the 
    establishment of a new annual reporting and certification 
    requirement [to] ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe and 
    reliable under a comprehensive test ban''.
        (11) On the same day, the President noted that the Secretary of 
    Defense and the Secretary of Energy have the responsibility, after 
    being ``advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of 
    DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of United 
    States Strategic Command'', to provide the President with the 
    information regarding the certification referred to in paragraph 
    (10).
        (12) The Joint Nuclear Weapons Council established by section 
    179 of title 10 is responsible for providing advice to the Secretary 
    of Energy and the Secretary of Defense regarding nuclear weapons 
    issues, including ``considering safety, security, and control issues 
    for existing weapons''. The Council plays a critical role in 
    advising Congress in matters relating to nuclear weapons.
        (13) It is essential that the President receive well-informed, 
    objective, and honest opinions, including dissenting views, from his 
    advisers and technical experts regarding the safety, security, 
    effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

(b) Policy

                           (1) In general

        It is the policy of the United States--
            (A) to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and reliable 
        nuclear weapons stockpile; and
            (B) as long as other nations control or actively seek to 
        acquire nuclear weapons, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent.

                    (2) Nuclear weapons stockpile

        It is in the security interest of the United States to sustain 
    the United States nuclear weapons stockpile through a program of 
    stockpile stewardship, carried out at the nuclear weapons 
    laboratories and nuclear weapons production plants.

                        (3) Sense of Congress

        It is the sense of Congress that--
            (A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic 
        nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign 
        leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting 
        against the vital interests of the United States;
            (B) the United States should continue to maintain nuclear 
        forces of sufficient size and capability to implement an 
        effective and robust deterrent strategy; and
            (C) the advice of the persons required to provide the 
        President and Congress with assurances of the safety, security, 
        effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons force 
        should be scientifically based, without regard for politics, and 
        of the highest quality and integrity.

(c), (d) Omitted

(e) Advice and opinions regarding nuclear weapons stockpile

    In addition to a director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a 
nuclear weapons production plant (under section 7274o of this title), 
any member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council or the commander of the 
United States Strategic Command may also submit to the President, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, or the congressional 
defense committees advice or opinion regarding the safety, security, 
effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

(f) Expression of individual views

    A representative of the President may not take any action against, 
or otherwise constrain, a director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a 
nuclear weapons production plant, a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons 
Council, or the Commander of United States Strategic Command for 
presenting individual views to the President, the National Security 
Council, or Congress regarding the safety, security, effectiveness, and 
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

(g) Definitions

    In this section:
        (1) The term ``representative of the President'' means the 
    following:
            (A) Any official of the Department of Defense or the 
        Department of Energy who is appointed by the President and 
        confirmed by the Senate.
            (B) Any member of the National Security Council.
            (C) Any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
            (D) Any official of the Office of Management and Budget.

        (2) The term ``nuclear weapons laboratory'' means any of the 
    following:
            (A) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California.
            (B) Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico.
            (C) Sandia National Laboratories.

        (3) The term ``nuclear weapons production plant'' means any of 
    the following:
            (A) The Pantex Plant, Texas.
            (B) The Savannah River Site, South Carolina.
            (C) The Kansas City Plant, Missouri.
            (D) The Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

(Pub. L. 105-85, div. A, title XIII, Sec. 1305, Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 
1952.)

                       References in Text

    Section 3138(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1994, referred to in subsec. (a)(5), was repealed by Pub. L. 105-
85, div. C, title XXXI, Sec. 3152(e)(1), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 2042.

                          Codification

    Section is comprised of section 1305 of Pub. L. 105-85. Subsecs. (c) 
and (d) of section 1305 of Pub. L. 105-85 amended section 7274o of this 
title.
    Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1998, and not as part of the Department of Energy 
Organization Act which comprises this chapter.

                          Transfer of Functions

    All national security functions and activities performed immediately 
before Oct. 5, 1999, by nuclear weapons laboratories and production 
plants defined in this section, transferred to the Administrator for 
Nuclear Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the 
Department of Energy, see section 2481 of Title 50, War and National 
Defense.


              ``Congressional Defense Committees'' Defined

    Congressional defense committees means the Committees on Armed 
Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, see section 3 of Pub. L. 105-85, 111 Stat. 1645, as 
amended by Pub. L. 106-65, div. A, title X, Sec. 1067(4), Oct. 5, 1999, 
113 Stat. 774.
