Network Working Group A. Brusilovsky
Internet-Draft I. Faynberg
Expires: September 2009 Z. Zeltsan
Alcatel-Lucent
S. Patel
Google, Inc.
April 2009
Password-Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Exchange (PAK)
draft-brusilovsky-pak-10.txt
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Abstract
This document proposes to add mutual authentication, based on
human-memorizable password, to the basic unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. The proposed algorithm is called Password-authenticated
Key exchange (PAK). PAK allows two parties to authenticate themselves
while performing the Diffie-Hellman exchange.
The protocol is secure against all passive and active attacks.
In particular, it does not allow either type of attackers to obtain any
information that would enable an off-line dictionary attack on the
password. PAK provides Forward Secrecy.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Conventions
3. Password-Authenticated Key exchange
4. Selection of parameters
4.1 General considerations
4.2 OTASP and WLAN Diffie-Hellman parameters and key expansion functions
5. Security considerations
6. IANA considerations
7. Acknowledgments
8. References
8.1 Normative references
8.2 Informative references
Authors' and contributors' addresses
1. Introduction
PAK has the following advantages:
- It provides a secure authenticated key exchange protocol.
- It is secure against offline dictionary attacks when passwords are used.
- It ensures Forward Secrecy.
- It is proved to be as secure as the Diffie-Hellman solution.
The PAK protocol [BMP00], [MP05], [X.1035] has been proven to be as secure
as the Diffie-Hellman [RFC2631], [DH76] in the random oracle model [BR93]. That is,
PAK retains its security when used with low-entropy passwords. Therefore,
it can be seamlessly integrated into existing applications, requiring
secure authentication based on such low-entropy shared secrets.
2. Conventions
- A is an identity of Alice
- B is an identity of Bob
- Ra is a secret random exponent selected by A
- Rb is a secret random exponent selected by B
- Xab denotes a value (X presumably computed by A) as derived by B
- Yba denotes a value (Y presumably computed by B) as derived by A
- a mod b denotes the least non-negative remainder when a is divided by b;
- Hi(u) denotes an agreed-on function (e.g., based on SHA-1, SHA-256,
etc.) computed over a string u; The various H() act as independent random
functions. H1(u) and H2(u) are the key derivation functions.
H3(u), H4(u), and H5(u) are the hash functions.
- s|t denotes concatenation of the strings s and t;
- ^ denotes exponentiation;
- multiplication, division, and exponentiation are performed over (Zp)*;
in other words:
1) a*b always means a*b (mod p)
2) a/b always means a * x (mod p), where x is the multiplicative inverse
of b modulo p
3) a^b means a^b (mod p).
3. Password Authenticated Key exchange
Diffie-Hellman key agreement requires that both the sender and
recipient of a message create their own secret random numbers and
exchange the exponentiation of their respective numbers.
PAK has two parties, Alice (A) and Bob (B), sharing a secret password PW
that satisfies the following conditions:
- H1(A|B|PW) != 0
- H2(A|B|PW) != 0.
The global Diffie-Hellman publicly-known constants, a prime p and a
generator g, are carefully selected so that:
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1. A safe prime p is large enough to make the computation of discrete
logarithms infeasible and
2. Powers of g modulo p cover the entire range of p-1 integers from 1 to
p-1. (References demonstrate working example of selections).
Initially, Alice (A) selects a secret random exponent Ra and computes g^Ra;
Bob (B) selects a secret random exponent Rb and computes g^Rb.
For efficiency purposes, short exponents could be used for Ra and Rb
provided they have a certain minimum size. Then:
- A --> B: {A, X = H1(A|B|PW)*(g^Ra)} (The above precondition on PW
ensures that X != 0);
Bob
receives Q (presumably Q = X), verifies that Q != 0 (if Q = 0,
Bob aborts the procedure);
divides Q by H1(A|B|PW) to get Xab, the recovered value of g^Ra;
- B --> A: {Y = H2(A|B|PW)*(g^Rb), S1 = H3(A|B|PW|Xab|g^Rb|(Xab)^Rb)}
(The above precondition on PW ensures that Y != 0)
Alice
verifies that Y != 0;
divides Y by H2(A|B|PW) to get Yba, the recovered value of g^Rb
and computes S1' = H3(A|B|PW|g^Ra|Yba|(Yba)^Ra);
authenticates Bob by checking whether S1' equals the received S1;
if authenticated, then sets key K = H5(A|B|PW|g^Ra|Yba|(Yba)^Ra)
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- A --> B: S2 = H4(A|B|PW|g^Ra|Yba|(Yba)^Ra)
Bob
Computes S2' = H4(A|B|PW|Xab|g^Rb|(Xab)^Rb) and
authenticates Alice by checking whether S2' equals the received S2;
if authenticated then sets K = H5(A|B|PW|Xab|g^Rb|(Xab)^Rb)
If any of the above verifications fails, the protocol halts; otherwise,
both parties have authenticated each other and established the key.
4. Selection of parameters
This section provides guidance on selection of the PAK parameters. First, it
addresses general considerations, then it reports on specific implementations.
4.1 General considerations
In general implementations, the parameters must be selected to meet algorithm
requirements of [BMP00].
4.2 OTASP and WLAN Diffie-Hellman parameters and key expansion functions
[OTASP], [TIA 683], and [WLAN] pre-set public parameters p and g to their "published"
values. This is necessary to protect against an attacker sending bogus p
and g values tricking the legitimate user to engage in improper
Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and leaking some information about the
password.
According to [OTASP], [TIA 683], and [WLAN], g shall be set to 00001101, and p to the
following 1024-bit prime number (Most-significant-bit first):
0xFFFFFFFF 0xFFFFFFFF 0xC90FDAA2 0x2168C234 0xC4C6628B
0x80DC1CD1 0x29024E08 0x8A67CC74 0x020BBEA6 0x3B139B22
0x514A0879 0x8E3404DD 0xEF9519B3 0xCD3A431B 0x302B0A6D
0xF25F1437 0x4FE1356D 0x6D51C245 0xE485B576 0x625E7EC6
0xF44C42E9 0xA637ED6B 0x0BFF5CB6 0xF406B7ED 0xEE386BFB
0x5A899FA5 0xAE9F2411 0x7C4B1FE6 0x49286651 0xECE65381
0xFFFFFFFF 0xFFFFFFFF
In addition, if short exponents [MP05] are used for Diffie-Hellman
parameters Ra and Rb, then they should have a minimum size of 384 bits. The independent
random functions H1 and H2 should each output 1152 bits assuming prime p is 1024 bits
long and session keys K are 128 bits long. H3, H4, and H5 each output 128 bits.
More information on instantiating random functions using hash functions
can be found in [BR93]. We use the FIPS 180 SHA-1 hashing function below
to instantiate the random function as done in [WLAN], however, SHA-256
can also be used:
H1(z): SHA-1(1|1|z) mod 2^128 | SHA-1(1|2|z) mod 2^128 |. . .| SHA-1(1|9|z)
mod 2^128
H2(z): SHA-1(2|1|z) mod 2^128 | SHA-1(2|2|z) mod 2^128 |. . .| SHA-1(2|9|z)
mod 2^128
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H3(z): SHA-1(3|len(z)|z|z) mod 2^128
H4(z): SHA-1(4|len(z)|z|z) mod 2^128
H5(z): SHA-1(5|len(z)|z|z) mod 2^128
In order to create 1152 output bits for H1 and H2, nine calls to SHA-1
are made and the 128 least-significant bits of each output are used. The input
payload of each call to SHA-1 consists of:
a) 32 bits of function type which for H1 is set to 1 and for H2 is set to 2;
b) a 32 bit counter value, which is incremented from 1 to 9 for each call to
SHA-1;
c) the argument z [for (A|B|PW)].
The functions H3, H4, and H5 require only one call to the SHA-1 hashing
function and their respective payloads consist of:
a) 32 bits of function type (e.g. 3 for H3);
b) a 32 bit value for the bit length of the argument z;
c) the actual argument repeated twice.
Finally, the 128 least-significant bits of the output are used.
5. Security considerations
Those are as follows:
- Identifiers
Any protocol that uses PAK must specify a method for producing a single
representation of identity strings.
- Shared secret
PAK involves the use of a shared secret. Protection of the shared
values and managing (limiting) their exposure over time is essential, and
it can be achieved using well-known security policies and measures.
If a single secret is shared among more than two entities (e.g., Alice, Bob, and
Mallory), then Mallory can represent himself as Alice to Bob without Bob being
any the wiser.
- Selection of Diffie-Hellman parameters
The parameters, p and g, must be carefully selected in order not to
compromise the shared secret. Only previously agreed upon values for
parameters p and g should be used in the PAK protocol. This is necessary to
protect against an attacker sending bogus p and g values and thus tricking
the other communicating party in an improper Diffie-Hellman exponentiation.
Both parties also need to randomly select a new exponent each time the key
agreement protocol is executed. If both parties re-use the same values,
then Forward Secrecy property is lost.
In addition, if short exponents Ra and Rb are used then they should have a
minimum size of 384 bits (assuming that 128-bit session keys are used).
Historically, the developers, who strived for 128-bit security (and thus
selected 256-bit exponents) added 128 bits to the exponents to ensure the
security reductions proofs. This should explain how an "odd" length of 384 has
been arrived at.
- Protection against attacks
a) There is a potential attack, the so-called discrete logarithm attack on the
multiplicative group of congruencies modulo p, in which an adversary can
construct a table of discrete logarithms to be used as a "dictionary". A
sufficiently large prime, p, must be selected to protect against such an
attack. A proper 1024-bit value for p and an appropriate value for g are
published in [WLAN] and [TIA 683]. For the moment, this is what has been
implemented; however, a larger prime (i.e., one that is 2048-bit long
or even larger) will definitely provide better protection. It is important
to note that once this is done, the generator must be changed, too, so this
task must be approached with extreme care.
b) An on-line password attack can be launched by an attacker by repeatedly
guessing the password and attempting to authenticate. The implementers of
PAK should consider employing mechanisms (such as lockouts) for preventing
such attacks.
- Recommendations on H() functions
The independent random functions H1 and H2 should output 1152 bits each,
assuming prime p is 1024 bits long and session keys K are 128 bits long. The
random functions H3, H4, and H5 should output 128 bits.
An example of secure implementation of PAK is provided in [Plan 9].
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6. IANA considerations
No IANA considerations at this time
7. Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful for the thoughtful comments received from Shehryar
Qutub, Yaron Sheffer, and Ray Perlner. Special thanks go to Alfred Hoenes,
Tim Polk, and Jim Schaad for the careful reviews and invaluable help in
preparing the final version of this document.
8. References
8.1 Normative references
[X.1035] ITU-T Recommendation X.1035 (2007), Password-authenticated key exchange
(PAK) protocol
[TIA 683] Over-the-Air Service Provisioning of Mobile Stations in
Spread Spectrum Systems, TIA TIA-683-D
8.2 Informative references
[Plan 9] Plan 9 ? An open source operating system, which implements PAK
http://netlib.bell-labs.com/plan9dist/
[BMP00] V. Boyko, P. MacKenzie, S. Patel, Provably secure password
authentication and key exchange using Diffie-Hellman,
Proc. of Eurocrypt 2000.
[BR93] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway, Random Oracles are Practical:
A Paradigm for Designing Efficient Protocols, Proc. Of the
fifth annual conference on computer and communications
security, 1993.
[DH76] W. Diffie and M.E. Hellman, New directions in cryptography,
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 22 (1976), 644-654.
[FIPS180] NIST Federal Information Processing Standards, Publication
FIPS 180-3, 2008
[IEEE1363] IEEE P1363.2, April 24, 2002, The PAK suite: Protocols for
Password-Authentication Key Exchange, P. MacKenzie
[MP05] P. MacKenzie, S. Patel, Hard Bits of the Discrete Log with
Applications to Password Authentication, CT-RSA 2005.
[OTASP] Over-the-Air Service Provisioning of Mobile Stations in Spread
Spectrum Systems, 3GPP2 C.S0016-C v. 1.0 5, 3GPP2, 10/2004.
[RFC2631] IETF RFC 2631, E. Rescorla, Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Method, Standards track,1999
[WLAN] Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking, 3GPP2 X.S0028-0,
v.1.0, 3GPP2, 4/2005
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Authors' and Contributors' Addresses
Alec Brusilovsky
Alcatel-Lucent
Room 9B-226, 1960 Lucent Lane
Naperville, IL 60566-7217 U S
Tel: +1 630 979 5490
Email: abrusilovsky@alcatel-lucent.com
Igor Faynberg
Alcatel-Lucent
Room 2D-144, 600 Mountain Avenue
Murray Hill, NJ 07974
Tel: +1 908 582 2626
Email: faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com
Sarvar Patel
Google, Inc.
76 Ninth Avenue
New York, NY 10011
Tel: +1 212 565 5907
Email: sarvar@google.com
Zachary Zeltsan
Alcatel-Lucent
Room 2D-150, 600 Mountain Avenue
Murray Hill, NJ 07974
Tel: +1 908 582 2359
Email: zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com
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