Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume 2007 (2007), Article ID 82184, 34 pages
doi:10.1155/2007/82184
Research Article
Rational Probabilistic Deciders—Part II: Collective Behavior
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 48109-2122, MI, USA
Received 7 December 2006; Accepted 23 February 2007
Academic Editor: Jingshan Li
Copyright © 2007 P. T. Kabamba et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
This paper explores the behavior of rational probabilistic deciders (RPDs)
in three types of collectives: zero sum matrix games, fractional interactions, and
Edgeworth exchange economies. The properties of steady states and transients are
analyzed as a function of the level of rationality, N, and, in some cases, the size
of the collective, M. It is shown that collectives of RPDs, may or may not behave
rationally, depending, for instance, on the relationship between N and M (under
fractional interactions) or N and the minimum amount of product exchange
(in Edgeworth economies). The results
obtained can be useful for designing rational reconfigurable systems that can
autonomously adapt to changing environments.